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Internet Protocol (IP) trace back is the enabling technology to control Internet crime. In this 
paper, we present novel and practical IP traceback systems which provide a defense system with the 
ability to find out the real sources of attacking packets that traverse through the network. IP traceback 
is to find the origin of an IP packet on the Internet without relying on the source IP address field. Due 
to the trusting nature of the IP protocol, the source IP address of a packet is not authenticated. As a 
result, the source address in an IP packet can be falsified (IP address spoofing). Spoof IP packets 
can be used for different attacks. The problem of finding the source of a packet is called the IP 
traceback problem. IP Traceback is a critical ability for identifying sources of attacks and instituting 
protection measures for the Internet. Most existing approaches to this problem have been tailored 
toward DDoS attack detection.
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Abstract - Internet Protocol (IP) trace back is the enabling 
technology to control Internet crime. In this paper, we present 
novel and practical IP traceback systems which provide a 
defense system with the ability to find out the real sources of 
attacking packets that traverse through the network. IP 
traceback is to find the origin of an IP packet on the Internet 
without relying on the source IP address field. Due to the 
trusting nature of the IP protocol, the source IP address of a 
packet is not authenticated. As a result, the source address in 
an IP packet can be falsified (IP address spoofing). Spoof IP 
packets can be used for different attacks. The problem of 
finding the source of a packet is called the IP traceback 
problem. IP Traceback is a critical ability for identifying 
sources of attacks and instituting protection measures for the 
Internet. Most existing approaches to this problem have been 
tailored toward DDoS attack detection.  
I. Introduction 
great amount of effort in recent years has been 
directed to the network security issues. In this 
paper, we address the problem of identifying the 
source of the attack. We define the source of the attack 
to be a device from which the flow of packets, 
constituting the attack, was initiated. This device can be 
a zombie, reflector, or a final link in a stepping stone 
chain. While identifying the device, from which the attack 
was initiated, as well as the person(s), behind the attack 
is an ultimate challenge, we limit the problem of 
identifying the source of the offending packets, whose 
addresses can be spoofed. This problem is called the IP 
traceback problem [1]. IP spoofing occurs when a 
hacker inside or outside a network impersonates the 
conversations of a trusted computer [2]. A hacker 
changes the routing table to point to the spoofed ip 
address, then the hacker can receive all the network 
packets that are addressed to the spoofed address and 
reply just as trusted users.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 : A Scenario of DOS Attack 
Several solutions to this problem have been 
proposed. They can be divided in two groups. One 
group of the solutions relies on Fig 1 A Scenario of DOS 
Attack.  
The routers in the network to send their 
identities  to  the  destinations  of  certain packets, either  
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encoding this information directly in rarely used bits of 
the IP header, or by generating a new packet to the 
same destination. The biggest limitation of this type of 
solutions is that they are focused only on flood-based 
(Distributed) Denial of Service [DoS] attacks [3], and 
cannot handle attacks comprised of a small number of 
packets. The second type of solutions involves 
centralized management, and logging of packet 
information on the network. Solutions of this type 
A 
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introduce a large overhead, and are complex and not 
scalable.
 
IP traceback
 
is a name given to any method for 
reliably determining the origin of a packet on the 
Internet. Due to the trusting nature of the ip protocol, the 
source IP address of a packet is not authenticated. As a 
result, the source address in an IP packet can be 
falsified (IP address spoofing) allowing for [7]
 
Denial of 
Service attacks (DoS) or one-way attacks (where the 
response from the victim host is so well known that 
return packets need not be received to continue the 
attack). The problem of finding the source of a packet is 
called the IP traceback problem. IP Traceback
 
[9] is a 
critical ability for identifying sources of attacks and 
instituting protection measures for the Internet. Most 
existing approaches to this problem have been tailored 
toward DoS attack detection. Such solutions require 
high numbers of packets to converge on the attack 
path(s).
 II.
 
Overview
 This section provides overview of IP header
 
[2] 
and the current state of the art approaches to IP 
traceback and evaluates. While sending data over the 
internet the IP header contains above details
 
(Fig:
 
2). 
Such as type of service, its length,
 
from which source 
and destination address. Header checksum for error 
correction and protocol-specifies the type of
 
protocol 
and set of rules in data exchange.
 
 Figure 2
 
:
 
IP Header
 Overview of an ideal traceback system is given below.
 •
 
Able to trace the attacker with a single packet.
 •
 
Minimal processing overhead during traceback.
 •
 
Classification based evaluation.
 •
 
No packet transformed through that techniques.
 •
 
Limited amount of additional memory requirement 
at the dedicated server and no additional memory 
requirement on network 
 •
 
High level of protection is preferred in a trace back.
 •
 
Network overhead based evaluation.
 •
 
Router overhead based evaluation.
 
 
 
•
 
Producing meaningful traces are limited to the 
range of deployment of the traceback system.
 
We are having different traceback schemes 
exist. Among those FDPM provides innovative features 
to trace the source of IP packets and can obtain better 
tracing capability than others. In particular, FDPM 
adopts a flexible mark length strategy to make it 
compatible to different network environments; it also 
adaptively changes its marking rate according to the 
load of the participating router by a flexible flow-based 
marking scheme. Evaluations on both simulation and 
real system implementation demonstrate that FDPM 
requires a moderately
 
small number of packets to 
complete the traceback process; add little additional 
load to routers and can trace a large number of sources 
in one traceback process with low false positive rates. 
The built-in overload prevention mechanism makes this 
system capable of achieving a satisfactory traceback 
result even when the router is heavily loaded. The 
motivation of this traceback system is from DDoS 
defense. It has been used to not only trace DDoS 
attacking packets but also enhance filtering attacking 
traffic. It has a wide array of applications for other 
security systems.
 
III.
 
Classification of Traceback 
Methods
 
Traceback methods can be broadly categorized
 
[2] as preventive and reactive. Preventive methods take 
precautionary steps in preventing DoS attacks. A wide
 
range of solutions has been proposed, however, this 
problem still remains as open one. The reactive 
methods solutions aim at identifying the source of the 
attacks. This is very important because attackers spoof 
their addresses, thus techniques are needed to trace 
back to the source to the source of the attack. The 
evaluation is based the above two categorized methods.
 
a)
 
Preventive Methods
 
i.
 
Ingress Filtering
 
One way to address the problem of 
anonymous attacks is to eliminate the ability to forge 
source addresses. One such approach, frequently 
called ingress filtering, is to configure routers to block 
packets that arrive with illegitimate source addresses. 
This requires a router with sufficient power to examine 
the source address of every packet and sufficient 
knowledge to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate addresses. Consequently ingress filtering is 
most feasible in customer networks or at the border of 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) where address 
ownership is relatively unambiguous and traffic load is 
low. As traffic is aggregated from multiple ISPs into 
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IP TRACEBACK Scenarios
• Correctly trace back attacks consisting of packets 
that undergo any number of transformations of any 
type.
transit networks, there is no longer enough information 
to unambiguously determine if a packet arriving on a 
particular interface has a “legal” source address. 
Moreover, on many deployed router architectures the 
overhead of ingress filter becomes prohibitive on high-
speed links. The principal problem with ingress filtering 
is that its effectiveness depends on widespread, if not 
universal, deployment. A secondary problem is that 
even if ingress filtering were universally deployed at the 
customer to ISP level, attackers could still forge 
addresses from the hundreds or thousands of hosts 
within a valid customer network.
 
 
Figure 3 : Ingress Filtering is used at router R4 to prohibit the attacker from using a source IP address residing 
outside the 10.0.0.0/24 prefix 
Ingress filtering restricts the routing of traffic that 
originates from a downstream network to only well-
known and advertised prefixes. Equivalently, a router 
must drop any packet whose source address does not 
belong to one of such advertised networks. 
Figure 2 depicts a simple network where 
ingress filtering is used against source address 
spoofing. For convenience, only IP addresses are used. 
With ingress filtering, router R4 drops any packet 
coming from subnet work spoofed source addresses to 
the victim V.[8] The spoofed source address, however, 
must reside inside the 10.0.0.0/24 prefix.  For instance, 
the  IP  address  of   a  neighbor  machine   could  be  
used as the source address  of  attack  packets.  In  
addition,  there  is  an  undesirable dependency  
between  security  of  end  hosts   and  universal  
deployment of  this  technique.  Since  the  filtering  
directly  affects  the  routing process,  inspecting  the  
source  address  of  every  packet  may  also require 
additional  resources from  routers. Further, some  
technologies, such  as  Mobile  IP  (Perkins,  2002),  
legitimately  employ  spoofed source addresses and 
could also be affected. 
A  protection  scheme  has  also  been  
proposed  to  protect  a  server from SYN flooding 
attacks (Belenky and  Ansari, 2003). Basically, [7] the 
scheme  keeps  track  of  half-opened  TCP  
connections  at  a  particular server.  The tracking is  not  
necessarily  implemented on end  servers;  it can  also  
be implemented  on routers  and  firewalls, for  instance. 
When the  number  of  these  connections  exceeds  a  
threshold,  either  new connection  requests  are  
blocked,  or  old  half-opened  connections  are closed  
in  order  to  make  room  for  new  connections.  This  
scheme, however,  is  specifically  designed  for  this  
kind  of  attack  and  does not provide any information 
about real perpetrators. 
 
 
b) Reactive Methods 
i. Link Testing 
Most existing traceback techniques [2] start 
from the router closest to the victim and interactively test 
its upstream links until they determine which one is used 
to carry the attacker’s traffic. Ideally, this procedure is 
repeated recursively on the upstream router until the 
source is reached. Below describe two varieties of link 
testing schemes, input debugging and controlled 
flooding. 
Disadvantage  
It consumes huge amount of resources, 
introduces additional traffic, and possibly causes denial 
of service when the number of sources needed to be 
traced increases. 
Input Debugging 
Many routers include a feature called input 
debugging[2],which allows an operator to filter particular 
packets on some egress port and determine which 
ingress port they arrived on. This capability is used to 
implement a trace as follows. First, the victim must 
recognize that it is being attacked and develop an attack 
signature that describes a common feature contained in 
all the attack packets. The most obvious problem with 
the input debugging approach, even with automated 
tools, is its considerable management overhead. 
Communicating and coordinating with network 
operators at multiple ISPs requires the time, attention 
and commitment of both the victim and the remote 
personnel many of whom have no direct economic 
incentive to provide aid. 
Controlled Flooding 
Burch and Cheswick have developed a link-
testing traceback technique that does not require any 
support from network operators. We call this technique 
controlled flooding [2] because it tests links by flooding 
them with large bursts of traffic and observing how this 
perturbs traffic from the attacker.  Using a regenerated 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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IP TRACEBACK Scenarios
a.
b.
c.
“map” of internet topology, the victim coerces selected 
hosts along the upstream route into iteratively flooding 
each incoming link on the router closest to the victim. 
Since router buffers are shared, packets traveling across 
the loaded link including any sent by the attacker have 
an increased probability of being dropped. 
c) Drawbacks of Input Debugging 
1. A high management overhead. 
2. It needs communication and coordination between 
different ISPs, when the attacking packets traverse 
different ISPs networks. 
3. This scheme works only for ongoing attacks. The 
last but not the least, it requires network 
administrators to have the appropriate technical 
skills and capabilities. 
i. Logging 
An approach suggested is to log packets at key 
routers and then use data mining techniques[9] to 
determine the path that the packets traversed. This 
scheme has the useful property that it can trace an 
attack long after the attack has completed. However, it 
also has obvious drawbacks, including potentially 
enormous resource requirements and a large scale 
interprovider database integration problem. We are 
unaware of any commercial organizations using a fully 
operational traceback approach based on logging. 
ii.
 
ICMP Traceback
 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) in 
need of trace out full path of the attacks. This approach 
was originally introduced by Bellovin. The principle idea 
in these schemes is for every router to generate an 
ICMP traceback message or iTrace directed to the same 
destination as the selected packet. The iTrace message 
itself consists of the next and previous hop information 
and a time stamp
 
As packets travel through the network, 
they gather and store information about the routers they 
traverse.
  
 
Figure 4
 
: Packet Marking
 
A router creates an ICMP traceback message, 
which contains part of a traversing IP packet, and sends 
the message to the packet’s destination. We can identify 
the traversed router by looking for the corresponding 
ICMP traceback message and checking its source IP 
address. Because creating an ICMP traceback message 
each router  creates ICMP traceback messages for the 
packets it forwards .If an attacker sends many  packets 
the target network can collect enough ICMP traceback 
messages to identify its attack path.
 
iii.
 
Packet Marking Algorithm
 
In Packet Marking Algorithm
 
[5] schemes, each 
router in addition to forwarding a packet also inserts a 
mark in the packet. This mark is
 
a unique identifier 
corresponding to this particular router.
 
As a result the victim can determine all the 
intermediate hops for each packet by observing the 
inserted marks. There are two variants to this marking 
scheme. First is the Deterministic Packet Marking
 
[5] 
(DPM) scheme in which each router marks all the 
packets passing through it with its unique identifier? This 
scheme is thus similar to the IP record-route option. This 
makes the reconstruction of the attack path at the victim 
trivial. But the downside to this scheme is that routers 
are slowed down as they have to perform additional 
functionality. An attacker who controls a trusted router 
can forge any path up to that router unless some further 
authentication scheme is used. A router that trusts data 
from an attacker effectively allows that attacker to act 
like a compromised router. Authentication methods 
could be used, but these add significant cost in the form 
of processing time and space in the marked packets. A 
downside of this scheme is that some packets will not 
be overwritten by any of the routers. The attacker can 
therefore write bogus information in all the packets 
knowing that some of these packets will get through and 
confuse the victim. This method also does not work well 
for DoS attacks that can work without a lot of packets as 
it requires a large number of packets to converge. The 
second instances is probabilistic packet marking[10] 
(PPM), DoS attacks can be prevented if the  spoofed 
source IP address is traced back to its origin which 
allows assigning penalties to the offending party or 
isolating the compromised hosts and domains from the 
rest of the network. 
 
Recently IP traceback mechanisms based on 
probabilistic packet marking have been proposed for 
achieving traceback of DoS attacks.
 
In this paper, we 
show that probabilistic packet marking of interest due to 
its efficiency and implement ability vis-à-vis deterministic 
packet marking and logging or messaging based 
schemes suffers under spoofing of the marking field in 
the IP header by the attacker which can impede 
traceback by the victim. Attacks on PPM: Attacks 
involving spoofed traceback data are described in. In 
general the two major problems in PPM reliability are the 
probabilistic nature of the algorithm causes some 
packets not to be marked by cooperating routers and 
these retain whatever marks are given them by the 
senders. Attackers can simply mark their original 
packets to intentionally mislead the traceback 
mechanism. In DPM routers mark all forwarded packets 
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IP TRACEBACK Scenarios
for every packet increases network traffic, however, 
with link identifying data. With PPM, multiple routers on 
the paths overwrite the same data, and each packet 
identifies at most one link. With DPM, each co-operating 
router adds link identifying data to the packet and each 
packet ends up with data that identifies all of the links 
(under universal co-operation) that it traversed. 
Disadvantages of Packet Marking 
1. Mark Length: It cannot adjust the length of marking 
field according to the network protocols deployed.  
2. Marking Rate is not flexible according to the load of 
the participating router.  
3. Number of Packets required is comparatively more.  
4. False Positive rate is large.  
5. Tracing Capability is less.  
6. The path reconstruction process requires high 
computational work, especially when there are many 
sources. For example, a 25-source path 
reconstruction will take days, and thousands of false 
positives could happen.  
7. When there are a large number of attack sources, 
the possible rebuilt path branches are actually 
useless to the victim because of the high false 
positives.  
iv. FDPM Traceback 
Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking [6] 
(FDPM) is the optimized version of DPM. This scheme 
provide more flexible features to trace the IP packets 
and can obtain better tracing capabilities over other 
previous IP traceback mechanisms, such as Link 
testing, logging, ICMP traceback, probability packet 
marking (PPM) and Deterministic packet marking 
(DPM).In FDPM schemes, the Types of Services (ToS) 
fields will be used to store the mark under some 
circumferences. The two fields in the IP header are 
exploited, one is fragment ID and other is Reversed flag. 
An identifying value is assigned to the ID field by the 
sender to aid in assembling the fragments of a 
datagram. Given that less than0.25%of all internet traffic 
is fragments, this field can be safely overloaded without 
causing serious compatibility problems. FDPM 
reconstruction process includes two steps: mark 
recognition and address recovery. Compared to DPM 
[5], the reconstruction process is simpler and more 
flexible. When each packet that is used to reconstruct 
the source IP address arrives at the victim, it is put into a 
cache, because in some cases the processing speed is 
lower than the arrival speed of the incoming packets.   
 
 
 
     Figure 5 :  IP (darkened) headers utilized in FDPM  
The source IP addresses are stored in the 
marking fields. The mark will not be overwritten by 
intermediate routers when the packet traverses the 
network. At any point within the network, e.g., the victim 
host, the source IP addresses can be reconstructed 
when required. Processing packets consume resources 
such as memory and CPU time of a participating router. 
Therefore, it is possible for a router to be overloaded 
when there are a large number of arrival packets waiting 
for FDPM to mark them. 
The flow-based marking scheme is proposed to 
solve the overload problem. When the load of a router 
exceeds a threshold, the router will discern the most 
possible attacking packets from other packets then 
selectively mark these packets. The aim is to alleviate 
the load of the router while still maintaining the marking 
function. 
Advantages  
1. Easy to find out packet loss and Duplicate packets.  
2. Reduces the network traffic.   
3. Bandwidth consumption is less. 
4. Flexible mark length: The length of marking field can 
be adjusted according to the network protocols 
deployed. 
5. Flexible mark rate: The marking rate can be 
changed adaptively according to the load of the 
participating router.   
6. Low false Positive rate.  
7. Number of packets required is comparatively less. 
8. Better Tracing Capability. 
9. It has Different probabilities that a router marks the 
attack packets.   
v. TBPM Method 
Topology [9] aware single packet IP traceback 
system is namely TOPO. It is based on the bloom filter 
which utilizes router’s local topology information, i.e., its 
immediate predecessor information, to traceback. 
TOPO can significantly reduce the number and scope of 
unnecessary queries and thus, significantly decrease 
the false attributions to innocent nodes. The main goals 
of TOPO as follows:  
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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IP TRACEBACK Scenarios
a.
a.
The FDPM [6] scheme utilizes various bits 
(called marks) in the IP header. The mark has flexible 
lengths depending on the network protocols used, 
which is called flexible mark length strategy. When an IP 
packet enters the protected network, it is marked by the 
interface close to the source of the packet on an edge 
ingress router.
1. To design a single packet IP traceback system, this 
has fewer unnecessary query messages and fewer 
false attributions to innocent nodes. 
2. To design a single packet IP traceback system this 
needs not to be fully deployed in the entire network. 
3. To design a mechanism which helps achieve the 
best performance of Bloom filters by adaptively 
adjust using parameter. 
Topology Based Packet Marking (TBPM) has 
been a new approach in Anti-IP spoofing techniques. 
TBPM builds on the strengths of the packet 
marking principal; however it focuses not merely on the 
source, but also the path traversed by a datagram. We 
have pointed out how a route discovery method can be 
more effective, especially during DoS attacks where 
edge routers that mark packets may themselves be 
unavailable as a result of the attack. Embedded 
topological information may enable DoS attacks to be 
prevented even by intermediate routers. TBPM also 
enables the source to be identified using a single 
marked packet; unlike previous techniques that require 
multiple packets. TBPM techniques are compatible with 
both IPv4 and IPv6; unlike present packet marking 
techniques that cannot be effectively implemented in 
IPv6 networks. 
IV. Technologies for Preventing 
Network Attacks 
Current technologies for protecting networks 
against attacks focus on access control and attack 
detection [2]. Although some methods can find the 
attacker’s identity, they are unsuccessful when the 
attacker’s true IP address is hidden or unknown. 
a) Firewalls 
Firewalls are widely used to protect networks 
against attacks, especially those coming from the 
Internet. Usually, firewalls control access based on 
source IP address, destination IP address, protocol 
type, source port number, and destination port number. 
For example, we can configure a firewall to deny any 
access to a WWW server except for WWW access using 
HTTP (destination port number 80). If an attacker 
attempts to exploit the WWW server using HTTP, 
however, the firewall cannot prevent it. 
b) Intrusion Detection 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) detects 
network attacks to a computer system. One major 
method currently implemented in IDS products is 
misuse detection. In this method, the IDS compare the 
attack signatures, which are features of known attacks, 
with the contents of packets on the network or log data 
on the host computer. When the packet content or log 
data matches an attack signature, the system 
recognizes that an attack has occurred. IDSs still pose 
accuracy problems for site managers, however. In 
practice, IDSs detect possible attacks, which site 
managers must examine to determine whether it is a real 
attack. 
c) Intrusion Source Identification 
Using IDSs, we can detect certain attacks and 
find the attack packets’ source IP addresses. Because 
the IP address is not enough to identify the attack 
source, however, we typically run a DNS inverse query 
to check the fully qualified domain name (FQDN),or look 
up the database in a WHOIS server to find the source 
identity (for example, organization name and e-mail 
address). If the attack’s purpose is penetration or 
reconnaissance, most attackers will hardly disguise the 
source IP address because they must receive a 
response from the target. 
An attacker who aims for denial of service 
(DoS), however, does not need to receive packets from 
the target and can therefore forge its source IP address. 
Ingress filtering deals with forged addresses.1 in this 
method, a router compares an incoming packet’s 
source IP address with a router’s routing table and 
discards packets with inconsistent source addresses as 
having been forged. This method is effective for many 
spoofed DoS attacks, but it fails if an attacker changes 
its source IP address to one that belongs to the same 
network as the attacker’s host. 
V. Limitation and Open Issues 
IP traceback has several limitations [1], such as 
the problem with tracing beyond corporate firewalls. To 
accomplish IP traceback, we need to reach the host 
where the attack originated.  It is difficult, however, to 
trace packets through firewalls into corporate intranets 
the last- traced IP address might be the firewall’s 
address. Knowing the IP address of the   organization’s 
network entry point, however, allows us to obtain 
information about the organization where the attacker’s 
host is located, such as the organization’s name and the 
network administrator’s e-mail address. If we can 
identify the organization from which the attack 
originated, the organization can often identify the user 
who launched the attack. 
Another limitation relates to the deployment of 
traceback systems. Most traceback techniques require 
altering the network, including adding router functions 
and changing packets. To promote traceback 
approaches, we need to remove any drawbacks to 
implementing them. 
Moreover, even if IP traceback reveals an 
attack’s source, the source itself might have been used 
as a stepping-stone in the attack. IP traceback methods 
cannot identify the ultimate source behind the stepping-
stone; however, techniques to trace attacks exploiting 
stepping-stones are under study. Some operational 
issues must also be solved before IP traceback can be 
widely deployed. To trace an attack packet through 
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different networks, for example, there must be a                            
common policy for traceback. We also need guidelines 
for dealing with traceback results to avoid infringing on 
privacy. Furthermore, we need to consider how to use 
information about an attack source identified by IP 
traceback.  
VI. Conclusion 
One conclusion we can draw from this is that 
unless IP trace back measures are deployed all over the 
Internet, they are only effective for controlled networks 
than for the Internet. Today we can find many tools for 
doing DoS attacks. DoS attacks have become very 
popular. Hence we need to design proper mechanisms 
to protect systems from such attacks. Mechanisms has 
been developed and deployed to prevent such attacks. 
But DDoS is still a problem as it is difficult to trace DDoS 
attackers and its effect is too bad. We need to start 
development towards defending DDoS. Some schemes 
are present which very well defends such attacks, but 
without the cooperation of ISPs it will be difficult to 
deploy any scheme. Though RFC asks to deploy 
ingress filtering, still very less number of ISPs have 
deployed that. Mechanisms like hash based traceback 
leads to many management issues, which in current 
scenario doesn’t seem to be working. Mechanisms are 
there which talks about single packet traceback, but 
there are lots of overheads for such methods. 
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